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tempers the sensational with frank assessments of China’s limitations.
At the heart of this examination of Chinese submarines, practically speaking, is
the potential showdown over Taiwan.
While Howarth notes that “China, like
Germany, is handicapped by geography,” he points out that the defense of
Taiwan is equally handicapped by
oceanography: its narrow and crowded
seas are ideal for diesel submarines. His
frankness, however, about such U.S.
problems as naval drawdown, global responsibility, vulnerability of surface
ships to missile saturation, and the difficulties of operations in narrow seas
gives one new pause.
As an example of what is best about his
work, Howarth considers not only the
tactical problems for China, Taiwan,
and the United States (including the
exact requirements for successful submarine warfare against a carrier-based
navy) but also the proper political context of that potential conflict—that a
politically free and economically prosperous Taiwan is a dagger pointed at
the heart of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Returning to
the intersection of tactics and strategic
judgment, Howarth includes in his final
chapter an economical summary of the
logic by which Chinese decision makers
might be optimistic enough about their
chances for success to initiate a conflict
with Taiwan.
One weakness in this confluence of politics, strategy, and tactical matchups is
that Howarth exaggerates the strategic
influence of the great thinkers on policy.
His demonstration of how submarine
warfare fits with Sun Tzu overreaches,
suggesting as it does that submarine
warfare fits perfectly with preformed
Chinese strategic preferences. The logic

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007

T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2007\Ventura\NWC Review Summer 2007.vp
Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:51 AM

BOOK REVIEWS

135

of a preemptive surprise attack is part
of the Chinese strategic culture, he says,
but one does not have to cite the number of wars per year in which the Ming
dynasty engaged, for example, in order
to support the conclusion that “the
Pentagon has some justification in considering that the risk of Beijing resorting to force to try to resolve the Taiwan
issue is growing with the modernization
and transformation of the PRC’s military capabilities.”
Howarth is better off with his more elegant logic that submarines are designed
for the task of concealment and surprise and that surprise is a good tactic
when one’s forces are inferior. Eastern
and Western war planners have both
made use of the submarine and have
appreciated it for the qualities for which
it is designed, regardless of whether
they were Chinese or their ancient ancestors were contemporaries of Sun Tzu.
Nonetheless, it is exactly this effort to
blend classic strategic thinking with
current politics and tactical complexities that is informative, intelligent, and
provocative in this book. It is recommended for any library on naval affairs
or Asian conflict, and good reading for
both U.S. and Chinese war planners.
PETER J. WOOLLEY

Fairleigh Dickinson University

Cole, Bernard D. Taiwan’s Security: History and
Prospects. New York: Routledge, 2006. 254pp.
$125

Given the importance of the Taiwan issue for U.S. foreign and security policy
in East Asia, it is striking that relatively
little has been written on Taiwan’s defense reform and modernization
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programs, especially in contrast to the
substantial amount of work scholars
and policy analysts have produced in
recent years on Chinese military modernization and its implications for regional security. Bernard Cole’s Taiwan’s
Security: History and Prospects, which
provides a comprehensive and well
written assessment of recent developments in Taiwan’s defense establishment, represents an important step in
filling this gap.
In this work, Cole—a respected China
scholar who served in the U.S. Navy for
thirty years and is now professor of international history at the National War
College—examines the changes currently under way in Taiwan’s armed
forces and defense bureaucracy. The
main purpose of Cole’s thorough and
well researched study is to assess
changes in Taiwan’s defense posture
and their implications for the island’s
security. After presenting a brief history
of Taiwan’s military and an overview of
the Chinese military threat, Cole explains that Taiwan in recent years has
been unwilling to increase the level of
resources devoted to its own military
capabilities. Although Taiwan is reorganizing its defense bureaucracy and its
military is professional and well trained,
the growing asymmetry in defense
spending between Taiwan and China is
resulting in a rapid erosion of Taiwan’s
long-standing qualitative edge over the
Chinese military. Indeed, Cole argues
quite persuasively that the cross-strait
military balance is tipping toward
China as a result of Taiwan’s relatively
modest response to the growing security
challenge represented by the acceleration of Chinese military modernization.
Consequently, Taiwan cannot defend
itself on its own and may not even be
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able to hold out until the U.S. military
could intervene decisively.
Cole also includes a brief discussion of
the factors underlying Taiwan’s unwillingness to do more to counter China’s
growing military capability. He argues,
first, that many officials in Taiwan believe Chinese military threats lack credibility and, second, that decision
makers in Taipei are convinced that the
United States would come to Taiwan’s
assistance even if they turn out to have
underestimated China’s willingness to
use force. According to Cole, the U.S.
decision to send two aircraft carrier
battle groups to the region during the
1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis not only
convinced Beijing that attacking Taiwan
would likely result in American military
intervention but also led Taipei to the
same conclusion. Given the assumptions that China lacks the willingness to
use force and that U.S. intervention is
virtually assured in the unlikely event of
a cross-strait conflict, many politicians
in Taiwan conclude that the island does
not really need to invest its own scarce
resources in defense. In all, Taiwan’s
Security makes an important contribution to scholarship and policy analysis
by providing a readable and informative
assessment of a previously understudied aspect of the U.S.-China-Taiwan
relationship.
MICHAEL S. CHASE

Naval War College

Asada, Sadao. From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The
Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006.
385pp. $36.95
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